Comparative Case Analysis: A powerful tool for typology development

What is Comparative Case Analysis?

Comparative Case Analysis (‘CCA’), also known as ‘Similar Fact Analysis’, is a technique used in criminal intelligence analysis to identify similarities and support decision making (Sacha et al, 2017).

Cases can be linked in CCA through any of the following:

a) Modus Operandi (or tactics, techniques, procedures)
b) Signatures and patterns
c) Forensic evidence
d) Intelligence

College of Policing (2023), United Kingdom

CCA is useful when analysing process-based crime types where perpetrators need to follow a defined set of steps to effect the crime. Examples of such crime types include fraud and financial crime, cybercrime, money laundering and Intellectual Property Crime (e.g. counterfeiting networks).

I use CCA when developing typologies, which I then convert to analytics-based detection models which are run as part of a continuous monitoring or detection program over a dataset to detect suspect transactions, individuals/ legal entities, or behaviour.

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Where can you collect cases to perform CCA?

So, you’ve worked out that CCA is appropriate to use in your situation. The next challenge is where to get your case study data from. Common sources include:

  • Indictments and statements of claim – depending on jurisdiction, these may be published by prosecutorial agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice, or by the courts (for tips, see my article on searching Australian court records).
  • Media reports – media monitoring and other Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) capabilities are essential for any financial crime or corporate security function. For information on how to build one, look at my 101 post.
  • Industry information sharing sessions – industry groups such as the Pharmaceutical Security Institute and the Australian Financial Crimes Exchange exist for this purpose.
  • Prisoner interviews – may be performed by law enforcement, regulators, journalists or academics for publication.
  • Academic case studies, published papers and conferences
  • Examination of your own case files based on historical incidents or near-misses.

Unfortunately, it is all too common to find cases that are incomplete. If you don’t control your data (such as cases sourced from the media) your ability to improve data quality is limited – you may need to exclude incomplete cases from the CCA.

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If you are using your own case files, consider changing your internal processes, templates and SOPs to collect the data you need in the future. If you encounter resistance, obtain buy-in from stakeholders by helping them understand what you need and why you need it.

How do you undertake Comparative Case Analysis?

CCA is an invaluable but involved process which will take time to complete. CCA has its roots in academia, particularly the social sciences (see Goodrick et al 2014), so some literature on the topic is irrelevant or too academic to be useful for typology development or intelligence analysis.

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CCA can be undertaken individually or within a group, although doing the work individually may lead to intelligence blindspots. My high level methodology is as follows:

1Define your scope, case criteria, and other considerations a) What are you attempting to achieve by performing this CCA? Is CCA the most appropriate method?
b) What risk are you seeking to mitigate and what type of case / crime type etc meets these criteria?
c) What timeframe, jurisdiction, industry / product / channel / customer type are in scope?
d) How might analytical bias arise in your methodology? How will you manage this?
2Collect your case information and prepare the data for analysisa) Refer to the ‘where can you collect cases to perform CCA?’ for suggestions
3Review each case for data quality and completenessa) Do you have sufficient information for each case?
b) Do your cases fit the criteria you defined in step 1?
c) Do you need to change your methodology?
d) Is the methodology viable with the avilable information?
e) What cases (if any) do you need to remove due to incomplete data?
4Develop a structured form or methodology to undertake the comparisona) How are you going to compare each case? I build a form or template as part of my approach which I populate with information from each case and use this for case comparison
b) What data elements do you want to compare? Details captured usually include entities (people, businesses, things such as vehicles or residences), locations and dates / times, activities (e.g. events, transactions), and attributes such as language in addition to Modus Operandi.
c) Comparison of this data enables the identification of patterns or attributes which can be used to link seemingly separate incidents together (remember criminals share with each other, a liked case doesn’t have to reflect the same individual).
5Determine where you will store your resultsa) Where will you store your captured data and analysis?
b) If dealing with large volumes of data, you may want to build a database or design a workbook in Microsoft Excel to collect the data for subsequent analysis.
6Read each case and identify each data elementa) Physically read the material for each case
b) Identify the data elements which you want to capture (step 4). One way to do this is using coloured pens or highlighters, with each colour representing a specific data element (e.g. entities).
c) Once identified, this information can be used to document your results (step 7)
7Document your resultsa) I tend to find Microsoft Word, PowerPoint or Excel is fine for this purpose, but ensure you store your CCA reports in a central location so they can be peridocially reviewed and updated.
b) An alternative is ‘visual CCA’, effectively using a visualisation tool such as Tableau or Microsoft PowerBI to analyse and present your findings (see Sacha et al 2017)
c) Ensure any assumptions, data gaps or hypotheses are clearly identified (ideally CCA is factual, so if there are information gaps you are better off leaving this blank than filling a gap with a hypothesis. The fact you have done this can get overlooked in future typology and detection model work and lead to erroneous results).
8Have an ‘independent party’ peer review or critique your worka) Having another party (e.g. team or peers, independent experts etc) not involved in original activity perform a review and challenge role.
b) This provides an opportunity to identify gaps, assumptions or conclusions in your analysis.
9Evaluate your results a) Are they complete?
b) How reliable do you think they are?
c) Are they sufficiently detailed and rigorous enough to use as a basis for typology development?
d) What if any rework do you need to do before finalising your CCA? Perform updates to your work as appropriate.
10Periodically refresh completed CCAsa) Threats such as fraud, financial crime and cybercrime are constantly changing in response to new processes, products, channels, internal controls and actions taken by fraud and security teams to mitigate these threats.
b) Implement a process to periodically reivew and update historical CCA, such as annually, and incorporate this into any detailed typologies.
Paul Curwell (2023). Comparative Case Analysis methodology,

A simplified example of a CCA data capture template (step 4) which has been populated with fictional case information (steps 6 and 7) is shown below:

A simplified example of a CCA data capture template (step 4) which has been populated with fictional case information (steps 6 and 7).

Typology development: the next step in operationalising detection

Whilst CCA is not a pre-requisite to developing a typology, it certainly helps. When designing your CCA approach, I recommend you consider the types of data you will need to build your typology and incorporate these into your methodology (see my previous article, ‘typologies demystified‘).

Analysing Modus Operandi or TTPs requires the application of a number of intelligence analysis methods and is too big to cover here. I will write about this separately in a future post.

Further Reading

DISCLAIMER: All information presented on ForewarnedBlog is intended for general information purposes only. The content of ForewarnedBlog should not be considered legal or any other form of advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Readers should consult their own advisers experts or lawyers on any specific questions they may have. Any reliance placed upon ForewarnedBlog is strictly at the reader’s own risk. The views expressed by the authors are entirely their own and do not represent the views of, nor are they endorsed by, their respective employers. Refer here for full disclaimer.

Mitigating risks from workplace sabotage

Workplace sabotage as an insider threat

My post ‘Product Tampering: A form of Workplace Sabotage’ defines sabotage as “to damage or destroy equipment, weapons, or buildings in order to prevent the success of an enemy or competitor” (Cambridge Dictionary).

When I think about how sabotage can occur in the workplace I find it easier to decompose it into three categories (which align to targets) for the purposes of prevention, detection and response:

  • Physical sabotage – intentional damage to a physical thing, such as critical, infrastructure, or device
  • IT sabotage – involving international damage to IT equipment or networks, software etc
  • Data sabotage – intentional destruction or compromise of valuable information or data, such as Intellectual Property or research data

Sabotage is typically discussed in a wartime context where either enemy agents or special forces, or alternately sympathetic or compromised insiders, do something to benefit a foreign power (for further discussion on threat actors see my previous post). However, we are increasingly seeing acts of sabotage being performed in the workplace.

Malicious insiders are well placed to commit workplace sabotage

Acts of workplace sabotage can be perpetrated in person (on-site) or virtually (online). From an insider threat context, we are likely to see cases of workplace sabotage involving disaffected employees, such as:

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Interestingly, in its 2006 study CERT refers to workplace IT sabotage as ‘trust betrayal’ and also places espionage in this category, however the paper is silent on including fraud. Fraud is probably the most common form of breach of trust in the workplace.

Don’t forget that workplace sabotage can also be perpetrated by staff members of your suppliers (see here)

To understand sabotage in more detail, we need to examine the elements of this offence.

Sabotage offences in Australia

Sabotage is a criminal offence in Australia at both the federal and state / territory levels. Under Section 82 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), the main elements (abbreviated) of sabotage offences include:

  • Intentional damage, destruction or impairment of any thing, substance or material (‘article’) used in connection with Australia’s defence
  • Intentional or reckless conduct which results in damage to critical infrastructure with a nexus to a foreign government or its principal
  • Intentionally or recklessly introducing a vulnerability into an article, thing or piece of software that has a critical infrastructure or national security purpose which makes it (a) vulnerable to misuse or impairment or (b) capable of being accessed or modified by someone not entitled to do so
  • Preparing for, or planning, a sabotage offence
  • Any instances of the above with a foreign nexus, including financing, support, oversight or participation

Under Commonwealth legislation, damage to public infrastructure includes anything that: destroys, interferes, results in loss of function or becomes unsafe / unfit for purpose, becomes unserviceable, is lost, limits or prevents access, becomes defective or contaminated, results in a degradation in quality, or causes serious disruption of an electronic system. This definition is quite broad and all-encompassing.

Image of public infrastructure

Some offences involving specialist products, such as food, pharmaceuticals or medical devices, may be considered acts of sabotage to the layperson, however these are actually criminalised under various product tampering offences. You can read more about this in my previous post.

How to investigate alleged sabotage in the workplace?

Whilst there is increasingly more research into workplace sabotage, there is very little in the literature on how to actually investigate such offences. This is likely because the majority of similar cases have a nexus to national security and would not be publicly available. However, there is some publicly available US Government guidance which I have adapted below in the following investigative strategy:

  • Preserve all evidence as quickly as possible in accordance with local laws and regulations
  • Who – determine the person(s) of interest (POI), including those with means, motive and opportunity and any facilators. Was the perpetrator an individual or part of a group? Background investigations should be performed as required
  • What – identify the actual target and qualify the extent of damage, noting the affected asset may not actually have been the intended target
  • When – confirm the exact time and date of the incident (or as close as possible) and begin building a time-event chart to document developments
  • Where – be clear on the precise location and understand any surrounding activities which may have influenced choice of target
  • Why – try to understand the reasons or rationale for the incident and the intended target, including consideration of motive and opportunity
  • How – understand the type of sabotage involved and methods used. This will likely involve a combination of investigation, analysis and technical examination
  • Was there any communication with the media, social media or internal office communications (a) indicating the POI(s) planned or was planning the act of sabotage, or (b) claiming responsibility?
  • Is there a foreign nexus such as direction, oversight, funding, communication or logistics?

The investigative steps above need to prove or disprove each element of the offence (previous section), meaning investigators need to prove the POI(s) did, tried, or intended to cause harm or damage or were reckless their actions.

Investigator analysing evidence

Can insider threat detection systems identify workplace sabotage before or during an event?

Having an understanding of what workplace sabotage is and how it typically occurs, we can turn our minds to how to detect it. There are quite a number of insider threat detection vendors on the market who claim their systems can do this, and there has been a number of academic studies performed in this area, primarily by Carnegie Mellon University (SEI CERT). In a follow up to this post, I will explore these concepts in more detail.

Further Reading

DISCLAIMER: All information presented on ForewarnedBlog is intended for general information purposes only. The content of ForewarnedBlog should not be considered legal or any other form of advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Readers should consult their own advisers experts or lawyers on any specific questions they may have. Any reliance placed upon ForewarnedBlog is strictly at the reader’s own risk. The views expressed by the authors are entirely their own and do not represent the views of, nor are they endorsed by, their respective employers. Refer here for full disclaimer.

Alert management and insider risk continuous monitoring systems

What is ‘Continuous Monitoring’ for Insider Threat Detection?

A core component of any Insider Risk Management program is what is referred to as Continuous Monitoring by the U.S. Government, which involves the collection, correlation and analysis of data to identify patterns of behaviour, activity or indications that a trusted insider may pose a threat (i.e. an ‘insider threat’) or be progressing down the Critical Path.

To perform Continuous Monitoring, organisations are purchasing solutions such as DTEX, Exabeam, Secureonix, and Splunk or alternatively using existing analytics platforms to introduce some level of capability. Microsoft Purview Insider Risk Management, launched in 2019, is another option in the vendor landscape. Irrespective of what system you use, they all have one thing in common: they generate ‘alerts’.

What is an ‘alert’ anyway?

Advanced analytics systems (such as those used in insider threat detection, workforce intelligence, fraud detection or cybersecurity) generate what are colloquially referred to as ‘alerts‘. Alerts are simply instances of activity (e.g. transactions, behaviours, relationships, events) which meet the criteria configured in the advanced analytics system models.

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Alerts that are generated are typically managed, or dispositioned, as a ‘case’ using some sort of case management system. Dispositioning an alert involves reviewing the information associated with that alert and potentially conducting further data collection or analysis specific to the alert’s “event type”, before determing what to do with it based on organisational policies. This sequential process is illustrated below:

Illustrating the sequential process from Event to Case or Closure (Curwell, 2022)

Some insider threat detection solutions offer detection analytics and case management as part of an integrated solution, some have no inbuilt case management functionality but easily integrate with a third party solution via API, and yet others accomodate both options. Case Management is a large topic in its own right which I will write about more in the future.

The three levels of insider risk ‘alert’ management

The literature on Insider Risk Management typically refers to three types of alert. Whilst the terminology and specifics is inconsistent between authors, audiences and vendors, the basic principles remain the same. My interpretation is explored more below:

Level 1 alert disposition comprises the steps take to review a system generated alert based on pre-defined or deployed detection models or rules. In some situations, Level 1 alerts may only comprise a single indicator, which is likely to give rise to more ‘false positives’ and may be easily triggered out of context. Level 1 alerts are typically anonymised or masked in many Insider Threat Detection systems on the market to prevent analysts identifying individuals and reducing opportunities for analytical bias. In terms of actions, a Level 1 analyst might:

  • Reject an alert as a false positive,
  • Place some sort of temporary increased monitoring on the individual if there are signs of suspicious behaviour but do not meet the organisation’s criteria for escalation, or,
  • Escalate the Level 1 alert to a Level 2 case where there characteristics of a case meet the businesses pre-defined criteria for escalation.

Level 1 alerts are usually the greatest in terms of volume, and are typically dispositioned by junior team members or in cases where risks are within tolerance, automated decision engines.

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Level 2 preliminary assessment is where the basics of what we consider a ‘real’ investigation begin, and may involve looking for patterns of behaviour, anomalies, or performing background investigations to gather context required to disposition what are often multiple alerts on the same individual, or which involve a single typology comprising multiple inter-related indicators or behavioural patterns.

Level 2 cases are often worked by more experienced team members. They typically commence with an anonymised case but if the case is not closed as a ‘false positive’, at some point the evidence may justify de-anonymising based on the organisation’s policies and procedures. The outcomes of a Level 2 case typically include:

  • Close a case as unsubstantiated / unable to substantiate / no case to answer;
  • Place the trusted insider or type of behaviour / activity on a watchlist so it can be more closely monitored in the future (often involving manual review without reliance on automated detection models);
  • Refer the matter to a line manager or other internal professional (e.g. HR, Compliance, Risk, IT) where action is required but criterial for Level 3 escalation is not met such as:
    • Trusted insiders who are at the early stages of progressing along the critical path and may benefit from counselling or individual support, and / or,
    • Staff who require more training, coaching or guidance to ensure proper compliance (i.e. ignorant or complacent insiders), or,
    • Identification of internal control gaps requiring remediation by the employer (i.e. cases where an employee is not a fault)
  • Escalate the case to Level 3 where an allegation of misconduct, fraud or other criminal behaviour is formed.

Level 3 comprises a formal internal investigation, performed by professionaly trained and appropriately accredited investigators (see ICAC, 2022). Sometimes it is appropriate for these investigations to be performed by external service providers – if unsure, guidance should be sought with General Counsel prior to commencing an investigation. These investigations involve not just evidence collection and data analysis from systems, but may also involve interviewing witnesses and suspects, taking statements, writing formal investigative reports and, in extreme cases, preparing briefs of evidence for criminal prosecution.

Understanding Insider Threat Detection Alerts (Curwell, 2022)

Level 3 investigations are not undertaken lightly

Just because a case is meets the organisation’s criteria and is escalated for Level 3 investigation does not necessarily mean that an investigation must or will commence (see ICAC, 2022). Businesses need strong governance and clear policies when it comes to internal investigations, starting with the management decision on whether a formal investigation is justified.

Typically this decision will be made by a special committee with delegated authority from the CEO or Board and comprising representation from senior management, legal, HR, risk, compliance, security and integrity, and sometimes internal audit. This decision is based off a number of factors which will be explored more in a future article, but the important thing is to have clear guidlines and evaluate each case in a consistent manner to avoid allegations of bias.

Importantly, even for Level 3 cases employers have a range of alternatives to a formal investigation, including changes to supervision or management arrangements, employee development, or other organisational action. Where a formal internal investigation is performed, employees must be afforded procedural fairness (also known as ‘natural justice’).

In my opinion, Level 2 alert dispositions are the most critical for any employer. They can identify and divert trusted insiders at early stages of progressing along the critical path, and whilst harm may have been done against the organised, this may be relatively minimal and / or recoverable for the organisation and trusted insider concerned. In contrast, it may not be possible or practical for malicious trusted insiders to recover from some types of Level 3 cases which are substantiated. It makes sense to disproportionately allocate organisational resources – including specialists from HR, Legal, IT, security, counsellors, and professional psychologists to resolve Level 2 issues, in comparison to Levels 1 and 3.

Level 2: source of greatest risk and greatest opportunity for diversion?

In contrast to Level 1 and Level 3 cases, Level 2 presents not only the greatest opportunity (as outlined above) but the greatest risk to the organisation. I have seen overzealous individiuals do substantial damage at this stage, far more so than Level 1 where opportunities to cause harm are limited due to viewing an anonymised alert in isolation, and Level 3 which are staffed by professional and experienced investigators, oversighted by appropriate governance and legal mechanisms and who have a deep understanding of how to perform their role.

Level 2 practitioners often have a combination of advanced skills, knowledge of the alert subject’s identity, however they typically lack of understanding of the law and protocols when conducting an internal investigation. This can lead to the commencement of what is effectively a Level 3 investigation without internal approval or oversight, potentially damaging employee engagement and trust in management, removal or termination of the insider risk management program, litigation or regulatory action, and even adverse mental health and welfare outcomes for the subject concerned.

It is imperative that Level 1 and 2 team members, particularly Level 2, recieve adequate training and guidance on what is and is not appropriate in their role. Any Insider Risk Management Program, including continuous monitoring, should be fair, transparent and developed in consultation with Legal, employees and where applicable unions. Poor practices or discipline in continuous monitoring can terminally damage organisational trust in such progams.

Further Reading

DISCLAIMER: All information presented on ForewarnedBlog is intended for general information purposes only. The content of ForewarnedBlog should not be considered legal or any other form of advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. Readers should consult their own advisers experts or lawyers on any specific questions they may have. Any reliance placed upon ForewarnedBlog is strictly at the reader’s own risk. The views expressed by the authors are entirely their own and do not represent the views of, nor are they endorsed by, their respective employers. Refer here for full disclaimer.